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Nomenclature 
ADS-B  Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast 
AFRC  Armstrong Flight Research Center   
ATC  air traffic control 
CPA  closet point of approach 
DAA  detect and avoid 
DMOD  distance modification 
FT3  Flight Test 3 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
HMD  horizontal miss distance 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization 
IP  initial point 
JADEM  Java Architecture for DAA Extendibility and Modeling 
LVC  Live Virtual Constructive 
MOPS  Minimum Operating Performance Standards 
NAS  National Airspace System 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration   
nmi  nautical miles 
SAAP  Sense-and-Avoid Processor 
TCAS  Traffic Alert/Collision Avoidance System 
TCPA, TCPA  time at closest point of approach 
tmod  modified tau 
VSCS  Vigilant Spirit Control System 
UAS  Unmanned Aircraft System 
Introduction 
 
The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System project, or 
UAS Integration in the NAS, aims to reduce technical barriers related to safety and 
operational challenges associated with enabling routine UAS access to the NAS. The 
UAS Integration in the NAS Project conducted a flight test activity, referred to as Flight 
Test 3 (FT3), involving several Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) research prototype systems 
between June 15, 2015 and August 12, 2015 at the Armstrong Flight Research Center 
(AFRC).  This report documents the flight testing and analysis results for the NASA 
Ames-developed JADEM-Autoresolver DAA system, referred to as “Autoresolver” 
herein. Four flight test days (June 17, 18, 22, and July 22) were dedicated to 
Autoresolver testing.  
 
The objectives of this test were as follows: 
 
1. Validate CPA prediction accuracy and detect-and-avoid (DAA, formerly known as 
self-separation) alerting logic in realistic flight conditions 
2. Validate DAA trajectory model including maneuvers 
3. Evaluate TCAS/DAA interoperability 
4. Inform final Minimum Operating Performance Standards (MOPS) 
 
Flight test scenarios were designed to collect data to directly address the objectives 1-3. 
Objective 4, inform final MOPS, was a general objective applicable to the UAS in the 
NAS project as a whole, of which flight test is a subset. This report presents analysis 
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results completed in support of the UAS in the NAS project FT3 data review conducted 
on October 20, 2015. Due to time constraints and, to a lesser extent, TCAS data 
collection issues, objective 3 was not evaluated in this analysis. 
Autoresolver Detect-and-Avoid System Description 
Java Architecture for DAA Extendibility and Modeling (JADEM) 
Java Architecture for Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) Extensibility and Modeling (JADEM) was 
developed at NASA Ames Research Center as a research and modeling tool for the 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) 
Project. Unmanned aircraft will be equipped with a DAA system that enables them to 
comply with the requirement to "see and avoid" other aircraft (i.e., remain “well clear”), 
an important layer in the overall set of procedural, strategic and tactical separation 
methods designed to prevent mid-air collisions. JADEM supports research on technical 
requirements and MOPS for UAS DAA systems by providing a flexible and extensible 
software platform that includes models and algorithms for all major DAA functions, as 
well as interfaces that allow for refinements to existing DAA functions. JADEM contains 
an abstract interface allowing for the integration of external DAA model implementations. 
JADEM is written in Java, and provides an Application Programming Interface for 
modeling DAA functions in a user's simulation environment of flight test infrastructure.  
There are seven functions within the typical DAA functional architecture handled by 
JADEM: Detect, Track, Evaluate, Prioritize, Declare, Determine, and Command. The 
Detect and Track functions model the surveillance system’s sensors on-board the UAS 
used to detect other aircraft. JADEM is able to model multiple sensor configurations 
including parameters for sensor errors, range, and field of regard. For the flight test 
environment, JADEM provides a pass-through surveillance mode that uses actual 
surveillance data from on-board sensors instead of modeling them.  The Evaluate, 
Prioritize, and Declare functions are responsible for evaluating each intruder detected by 
the surveillance system and determining whether to provide an alert and the severity of 
the alert to the pilot. The Determine function is the process by which maneuver guidance 
is supplied to the UAS pilot and a maneuver is determined in order to resolve alerted 
threats. Lastly, the Command function is the process by which the pilot enters a 
maneuver into their ground control station, and this maneuver is transmitted through a 
link between the ground control station and the unmanned aircraft.   
There is an array of different alerting methodologies and maneuver guidance algorithms 
within JADEM; those used in FT3 are discussed below. 
Well Clear and Alerting Threshold Definitions 
The DAA system on an UAS, noted as the ownship, suggests guidance that aims to 
maintain “Well Clear” with intruders.  The definition of Well Clear is based on three 
separation metrics:  
1. Modified Tau, denoted by 𝜏"#$ with a unit of time 
2. Horizontal Miss Distance at the CPA, denoted by 𝐻𝑀𝐷 
3. Vertical Separation, denoted by 𝑑) 
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The first two metrics are computed from the ownship’s horizontal position and velocity 
relative to the intruder. The third metric is the vertical distance by which the two aircraft 
are separated. 
Modified Tau (𝜏"#$) is defined as: 𝜏"#$ = + ,-+./0.-,, 	, for closing geometries where 𝑟 > 𝐷𝑀𝑂𝐷, 
 𝜏"#$ = 0	, for 𝑟 ≤ 𝐷𝑀𝑂𝐷, 
 𝜏"#$ = 𝑖𝑛𝑓, for non-closing geometries where 𝑟 > 𝐷𝑀𝑂𝐷, 
 
where r and 𝑟 are the horizontal range and range rate, respectively. 𝐷𝑀𝑂𝐷 is a distance 
parameter.  
 𝐻𝑀𝐷 is the predicted closest horizontal distance between now and the future, if the two 
aircraft fly straight paths with their current velocities.   
 
The ownship is said to have lost Well Clear with an intruder when 
 0 ≤ 𝜏"#$ ≤ 𝜏"#$∗ 	. 𝑎𝑛𝑑.		𝐻𝑀𝐷 ≤ 𝐻𝑀𝐷∗ 	. 𝑎𝑛𝑑. −ℎ∗ ≤ 𝑑) ≤ ℎ∗   
 
with 	𝜏"#$∗ = 35	𝑠𝑒𝑐, 𝐻𝑀𝐷∗ = 4000	𝑓𝑡, 𝐷𝑀𝑂𝐷 = 4000	𝑓𝑡, and ℎ∗ = 450	𝑓𝑡. Note that 𝐷𝑀𝑂𝐷 is always set to equal 𝐻𝑀𝐷∗. Figure 1 depict a schematic diagram of the Well 
Clear zone. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A schematic representation of the Well Clear zone. 
  
  
τmod
h*	450	ft 
35sec 
HMD*	4000	ft 
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Table 1: Alert types and thresholds 
Alert 
Level 
Name Pilot Action 
DAA Alert 
Threshold 
Alert Time 
(Time Until 
Penetrating 
Alert 
Threshold) 
Symbology 
Aural Alert 
Verbiage 
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Self 
Separation 
Warning 
Alert 
Immediate action required 
to avoid a well clear 
violation, notify ATC as 
soon as practicable after 
taking action 
HMD* = 0.75 nmi 
h* = 450 ft 𝜏"#$∗  = 35 sec 
25 sec 
(TCPA 
approximate: 
60 sec) 
 
“Traffic, 
Maneuver 
Now” 
3 
Corrective 
Self 
Separation 
Alert 
Action to remain well 
clear will be necessary if 
the encounter does not 
change, coordinate with 
ATC to determine an 
appropriate maneuver 
HMD* = 0.75 nmi 
h* = 450 ft 𝜏"#$∗  = 35 sec 
75 sec 
(TCPA 
approximate: 
110 sec) 
 
“Traffic, 
Separate” 
2 
Preventive 
Self 
Separation 
Alert 
Action to remain well 
clear will be necessary 
only if one or both aircraft 
make both a horizontal 
and vertical maneuver, do 
not climb/descend or turn 
into the intruder and be 
prepared to respond if the 
intruder begins 
climbing/descending or 
turning towards you. You 
may want to coordinate 
with ATC about the 
intentions of the intruder. 
HMD* = 1.0 nmi 
H* = 700 ft 𝜏"#$∗  = 35 sec 
75 sec 
(TCPA 
approximate: 
110 sec) 
 
“Traffic, 
Monitor” 
1 
Self 
Separation 
Proximate 
Alert 
No action necessary to 
avoid this aircraft, but its 
presence should be 
considered when 
determining a resolution 
maneuver to avoid other 
aircraft. 
HMD* = 1.5 nmi 
h* = 1200 ft 𝜏"#$∗  = 35s 
85 sec 
(TCPA 
approximate: 
120 sec) 
 
N/A 
0 
None 
(Target) 
No action necessary, 
There is an aircraft within 
your sensor range, but it 
is not expected to present 
a threat. 
Within 
surveillance field 
of regard 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
Autoresolver Directive Guidance Algorithm 
The Autoresolver is one of many DAA maneuver guidance algorithms within the JADEM 
architecture.  The Autoresolver originated from the Autoresolver algorithm within the 
Advanced Airspace Concept (Erzberger, Lauderdale, & Chu).  Autoresolver was 
designed as a strategic separation assurance algorithm that addresses four air traffic 
control problems—separation conflicts, weather avoidance, arrival sequencing, and out-
of-conformance—in an integrated fashion.  The separation conflict resolver function of 
the Autoresolver was envisioned to identify efficient trajectories that resolve projected 
separation losses (i.e., CPA of less than 5 nmi horizontally and 1,000 ft vertically) for 
communication to aircraft operators or air traffic controllers. 
 
For DAA applications, the Autoresolver algorithm was adapted for pilot-in-the-loop DAA 
guidance, where the goal is to avoid losses of well clear (as distinct from violations of the 
legal spatial separation standard).  The principal attributes of the DAA problem that 
distinguish it from the conventional ATC separation problem are shorter look-ahead-
times, lack of intent information for intruder aircraft, smaller spatial separation standards, 
introduction of time-based separation standards in addition to spatial, more frequent 
update rates, and single “ownship” point-of-view vs. centralized separation management 
of multiple aircraft in an airspace. 
 
With any DAA system, if an intruder causes a Corrective Self-Separation Alert (level 3) 
or a Self-Separation Warning Alert (level 4), the pilot needs to take action. For the DAA 
system here, JADEM, the Autoresolver computes a resolution in the form of a turn or 
altitude maneuver to assist the pilot in remaining well clear of the intruder. The 
Autoresolver was integrated with the Vigilant Spirit Control System (VSCS) ( Feitshans, 
Rowe, Davis, Holland, & Berger) developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory.  
Figure 2a and Figure 2b show examples of the Autoresolver directive guidance for a 
turn and an altitude maneuver, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a)    b)  
 Figure	2:	Autoresolver	directive	guidance:	a)	turn	maneuver,	b)	altitude	maneuver	
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Flight Test Operations  
This section provides a brief description of the flight test operations as it pertains to flight 
test data collection. A detailed description of flight test operations including test aircraft 
equipage, flight test procedures and actual flight test cards can be found in (Marsten, 
Sternberg, & Valkov).  
Test Aircraft 
The UAS under test was NASA’s Ikhana (NASA 870), referred to as the ownship herein. 
NASA’s Ikhana is based on a General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper UAS but with test-specific 
avionics associated with the DAA and radar systems installed. The primary intruder 
aircraft was a Beechcraft C90 King Air owned by Honeywell (N3GC). The AFRC’s T-34 
(NASA 865) was also used as an intruder aircraft. 
Encounter Scenario Design 
The encounter scenarios were designed to collect data to specifically address flight test 
objectives while abiding by the required flight safety constraints. Scenarios covered a 
broad range of encounter angles and vertical profiles. Figures 3 through 5 depict the 
encounter angles and vertical profiles for the various scenario types. A scenario 
nomenclature that combined the vertical profile with the encounter angle was used 
throughout this flight test. For example, scenario L12A designated a head-on encounter 
(“A”) between a level ownship and a level intruder (“L12”). A summary of the scenarios, 
including encounter angles, speeds, etc., is provided in Appendix Table A1. The sections 
below describe how each scenario type supports the flight test objectives.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Pairwise encounter angles 
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Unmitigated and mitigated scenarios 
Objective 1 and 2 were associated with Autoresolver trajectory prediction accuracy as 
measured at the CPA and during a DAA maneuver as directed by the Autoresolver 
guidance, respectively. The encounter angles for these objectives are shown in Figure 3.  
 
In order to collect data to measure actual separation at the CPA and analyze prediction 
accuracy for objective 1, scenarios were designed so that the ownship and intruder 
would maintain the flight condition specified in the test cards from the planned initial 
point (IP) to the CPA. These encounters were referred to as “unmitigated” because they 
were designed with the requirement that neither aircraft make any maneuver to mitigate 
the impending loss of well clear.  
 
At the CPA, the planned minimum horizontal separation was zero nautical miles (nmi) 
and the minimum vertical separation was 1,000 feet, i.e., the primary flight safety 
constraint. An artificial vertical offset was applied to the Autoresolver algorithm in order 
to negate the actual safety offset and make the ownship and intruder appear co-altitude. 
The resulting Autoresolver alerts and guidance were recorded for post-flight analysis. 
However, the UAS pilots were instructed to ignore any Autoresolver guidance for these 
specific unmitigated encounters. 
 
The same encounter angles and vertical profiles were used to collect data to address 
objective 2. However, for these “mitigated” encounters, the UAS pilot was asked to 
comply with the guidance cues provided by the DAA system (Autoresolver), thus 
mitigating the impending loss of well clear. Data were collected to measure how 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Vertical profiles of encounters 
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accurately the flown trajectory adhered to the DAA-advised trajectory and to measure 
the corresponding separation between aircraft.  
TCAS interoperability scenarios 
The TCAS interoperability scenarios were designed to explore the relative timing 
between TCAS and DAA (i.e., Autoresolver) alerts. Because TCAS is an operational 
system, it is not possible to fly an encounter with a vertical safety offset and artificially 
“trick” the TCAS system to think there is a threat, as was done for the DAA tests 
described previously. Therefore, these TCAS encounters had to be flown with actual 
separations that would trigger a TCAS alert. These encounters were flown unmitigated, 
with pilots ignoring Autoresolver and TCAS advisories. The minimum flight safety 
requirements for these TCAS encounters were 0.5 nmi lateral and 300 ft vertical offsets. 
The TCAS encounter angles and lateral offset are shown in Figure 5. Only the level-level 
vertical profile was flown for these TCAS encounters (Figure 4). For safety and pilot 
comfort, multiple TCAS encounters were flown using a “build-down” approach that 
decreased vertical separation from 1,000 ft to 500 ft and then to the minimum vertical 
separation of 300 ft. TCAS alert was expected at 300 ft vertical separation. As 
mentioned earlier, TCAS interoperability scenarios were flown but were not analyzed 
with respect to objective 3 due to TCAS data collection and time synchronization issues. 
However, data from these scenarios contributed to the set of unmitigated encounters 
used to evaluate trajectory prediction accuracy (Objective 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: TCAS encounter angles 
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Flight Test Data Description 
Data were collected during the flight test and further processed afterwards. Figure 6 
depicts a high-level diagram about the data flow and types of data recorded. The 
diagram is simplified to illustrate only those elements related to data collection. The 
dashed boxes represent processes or devices, whereas the solid boxes represent data 
storage. The solid arrows represent data flow in real time during the flight test, whereas 
the dotted arrows represent data flow in post-processing. The following sections 
describe data collection during the flight test and in post-processing, respectively. 
 
Overview of Flight Test Data Collection System 
Surveillance data from individual sensors onboard the ownship were recorded and 
stored by the Sense-and-Avoid Processor (SAAP). The onboard surveillance sensors 
included the airborne radar, TCAS, and ADS-B. SAAP also stored the ownship’s position 
and velocity states measured by the ownship’s GPS and other sensors. The surveillance 
data were sent to an onboard fusion tracker from Honeywell that performed track 
coordinate transformation, filtering, association, and fusion. Using the SAAP control 
panel, the UAS flight crew could selectively turn on inputs from specific sensors that 
were sent to the fusion tracker or bypass the tracker entirely. The processed data were 
then transmitted as flight state messages to the ground. The content of these messages 
included the ownship and the intruders’ ID, time, position, and ground velocity. The 
ownship’s state also contained its velocity with respect to the wind. This allowed 
estimates of winds experienced by the ownship. The flight state message had an update 
rate of 1 hertz.  
 
The Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) Gateway (middle-top entity in Figure 6) (Soler, 
Jovic, & Murphy) received flight state messages, time-stamped them, and forwarded 
Figure 6: Data flow and types of flight test data for analysis: dashed boxes for processes 
or devices, solid boxes for data storage, solid arrows for real-time data flow, and dotted 
arrows for post-processing data flow. 
Onboard 
Surveillance LVC Gateway SaaProc 
SAAP Data LVC Messages JADEM Log  
LVC Playback 
Fusion 
Tracker 
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them to the SaaProc, a real-time message-handling layer that wrapped JADEM. The 
LVC Gateway logged these flight state messages in LVC message files (bottom middle 
entity). The LVC Gateway also received guidance messages from SaaProc and 
forwarded them to the display system, VSCS (not shown). 
 
The SaaProc (top-right box in Figure 6) read the flight states and computed alerts and 
guidance maneuvers accordingly. It sent the guidance maneuvers as messages to the 
LVC Gateway, which forwarded them to VSCS. SaaProc recorded the flight states, 
alerts, and maneuvers as log files.  
Data Collection Anomalies During Flight 
One of the primary functions of Honeywell’s fusion tracker was to associate track data 
received from the SAAP for multiple targets and surveillance sensor sources with the 
appropriate intruder aircraft. For aircraft equipped with ADS-B, an ICAO callsign was 
available, and it was associated with the intruder target. Unfortunately, this callsign-to-
target association logic within the fusion tracker did not work properly with the input 
SAAP data during flight test data collection for the Autoresolver system. This problem 
caused the callsign for a given track to constantly change and, thus, appeared as 
multiple targets to the Autoresolver system. Consequently, the SAAP control panel was 
configured with the fusion tracker deselected (i.e., bypassed) and ADS-B selected as the 
only surveillance sensor. The result was Autoresolver received track targets from ADS-B 
surveillance only but with the consistently correct callsign associated with it. However, 
flight data from all other surveillance sources were still recorded by the SAAP and were 
processed post-flight. 
 
Mitigated scenarios flown on June 22 were impacted by unexpectedly noisy vertical 
speed and altitude intruder state data. As described above, mitigated scenarios required 
the UAS pilot to execute maneuvers based on Autoresolver guidance. The noisy state 
data caused the Autoresolver guidance to be unstable, thus confusing the pilots. The 
resulting scenarios flown that day were considered unsuccessful and were repeated on 
July 22. Mitigated scenarios flown on July 22 benefitted from the implementation of a 
Kalman filter to the Autoresolver system. This Kalman filter smoothed the vertical speed 
and altitude measurements, thus stabilizing the trajectory predictions and resulting 
Autoresolver guidance cues. 
Post Processed Flight Data 
Plans were made prior to flight for Honeywell to post-process and extract individual 
surveillance sensor data from SAAP data recorded during flight. These data were 
reformatted into LVC flight state messages so that they could be replayed through 
Autoresolver for additional analysis. Four sets of LVC flight state messages were 
created by Honeywell by running the SAAP data through the fusion tracker. Each set 
was characterized by its surveillance sensor type(s): 
• Airborne radar only 
• TCAS mode S only 
• ADS-B only 
• Airborne radar, TCAS mode S, and ADS-B together 
The tracker output was converted to flight state messages that complied with the LVC 
Gateway message format.    
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The ownship flight states in the LVC message files from Honeywell contained the 
ownship’s ground speed and ground course, but lacked the ownship’s true airspeed and 
true course. While this did not affect the alert detection, it did affect the computation of 
maneuver guidance. These ownship state messages were therefore replaced with those 
generated during the flight test that contained both sets of speeds and courses.  
 
An LVC playback tool was used to read the LVC message files and to send them to the 
LVC Gateway while preserving the relative timing of the messages. The Gateway 
forwarded the messages to SaaProc for alert and guidance computation. See the dotted 
arrows in Figure 6 for all the post-processing data flows. 
 
A Kalman filter of the intruder’s altitude and vertical speed inside JADEM was applied to 
investigate the effect of smoothed vertical speeds on the alert stability. Both the 
measured altitude and vertical speed were used as input. The parameters of the filter 
were tuned so as to reduce the vertical speed noise without resulting in an altitude lag of 
more than 10 seconds. For each of the four sets of surveillance data, both a SaaProc 
with a filter and a SaaProc without a filter were run to collect alert and guidance data.  
Additional Computed Data 
For unmitigated encounters, a suite of data analysis tools were developed to compute 
the following data: 
• Predicted trajectories at every time step within an encounter’s time window-- 
These data were computed by JADEM but not logged due to performance 
impacts. The predicted trajectories created by this analysis tool were identical to 
those generated by JADEM in real time. 
• Horizontal and vertical prediction errors at the ownship and intruder’s actual time 
of CPA, as a function of the look-ahead time prior to the actual CPA 
• The alert metrics tmod, h, and HMD along predicted trajectories. These metrics 
were used to investigate alert discontinuity and identify which separation metric 
went out of its threshold.  
 
Analysis of mitigated encounters focused on comparing actual trajectories to predicted 
ones. Special care was taken to remove two types of intent errors. The first intent error 
was a turn angle error due to a wind-related discrepancy between VSCS and JADEM in 
translating the turn advisory. As a result, the actual maneuver executed by the ownship 
deviated from the Autoresolver advisory by 5 to 10 degrees in ground course. The 
second intent error was from the unknown time an advisory was actually executed. A 
time must be picked for each encounter in order to select appropriately a predicted 
trajectory for trajectory comparison. 
 
To remove these two types of intent errors from the comparison, the ownship’s actual 
trajectory was used to derive a turn angle and a turn start time. The turn start time was 
taken as the time the predicted trajectory was created. The re-creation of predicted 
trajectories called the JADEM library functions using the same turn modeling schemes 
configured for Autoresolver.  
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Analysis and Results 
A significant amount of flight test data were collected during flight which, in turn, were 
further processed post-flight. This report only presents analysis results completed in 
support of the UAS in the NAS project FT3 data review conducted on October 20, 2015. 
Due to time constraints and, to a lesser extent, TCAS data collection and time 
synchronization issues, objective 3 was not evaluated in this analysis. However, data 
collected during scenarios that were originally designed to meet the TCAS 
interoperability objective were used to support other objectives. Table 2 summarizes the 
encounter data used in support of this analysis. 
 
Table 2: Summary of encounters performed on the four flight test days. Encounters in 
white cells represent data analyzed in this report. 
Encounters Unmitigated Mitigated DAA TCAS 
6/17/2015 6 9  
6/18/2015 20 2  
6/22/2015   20 
7/22/2015 5  12 
 
While the encounters were planned to have the intruder well within the alert threshold to 
ensure stable and consistent alerts, execution errors brought some encounters closer to 
or over the edge of the alert threshold. Figure 7 shows the actual horizontal and vertical 
separations of the ownship and the intruder at the CPA for each of the 26 unmitigated, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Separation at the actual CPA for each DAA encounter 
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DAA (non-TCAS) encounters analyzed. Most of the encounters resulted in small 
separation distances at their CPAs. A few resulted in separation values close to the alert 
threshold represented by the dotted lines. In fact, six encounters resulted in values 
outside the alert threshold zone. For encounters close to or outside the alert threshold, 
the alert stability was expected to be more sensitive to surveillance noise. Note that the 
computation of the CPA here utilizes both horizontal and vertical components of the 
separation distance.  
Predicted Separation Error 
The unmitigated encounter served as the basis for predicted separation error analysis. 
As described above, unmitigated encounters were those encounters in which both the 
ownship and the intruder flew in a stable manner from the IP to the planned CPA. Actual 
separation can then be measured at select points of interest (e.g., the CPA and at the 
point of first loss off well clear) and be compared to the predicted separation at various 
look-ahead times prior to the point of interest. 
 
 
A notional example of separation analysis methodology using CPA as the point of 
interest is shown in Figure 8. Actual separation was measured at the time of CPA, tCPA, 
using ADS-B surveillance data as the reference. Trajectories were generated with each 
individual surveillance sensor as input. Predicted separation at the CPA is then 
calculated at each look-ahead time prior to the CPA, Dtn. Separation error at the CPA for 
each look-ahead time is defined as the difference between the predicted separation at 
Dtn and the actual ADS-B separation at tCPA. Similar predicted separation errors were 
calculated for the point of first loss of well clear instead of CPA. Figure 9 shows the 
predicted horizontal and vertical separation errors at the CPA for a single encounter 
(L32C) with trajectories generated with ADS-B and radar data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Predicted Separation Error Analysis 
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For encounter L32C, Figure 9 shows predicted vertical separation error for radar-based 
trajectories was significantly larger than errors for ADS-B based trajectories. As 
expected, predicted error decreases as time-to-CPA, or look-ahead time, decreases. 
The predicted horizontal separation errors were similar in magnitude for ADS-B and 
radar-based trajectories, however radar data did appear noisier.  
A box-whisker format was used to plot the aggregate prediction errors for multiple 
encounters. Figure 10 shows an example of a box-whisker plot for the aggregate CPA 
prediction errors for ADS-B data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Predicted separation error for encounter L32C  
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Each box-whisker combination is an aggregate of all samples from the set of 34 
unmitigated DAA and TCAS encounters (excluding turning scenarios L12M/N) over a 
look-ahead time interval (i.e., time-to-CPA) of 10 seconds. The mean of those samples 
is represented with a red “+” and the median is represented with a red line. The blue box 
represents the range of samples between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile, 
while the whiskers encompass data between 9th and 91st percentile.  
 
Figure 11 shows a side-by-side comparison of CPA prediction error for ADS-B and 
radar-based trajectories for the same set of 34 unmitigated encounters. As shown earlier 
for the single encounter in Figure 9, the aggregate predicted vertical separation error for 
radar-based trajectories was significantly greater than for ADS-B based trajectories. 
Mean predicted vertical separation error for radar trajectories was nearly 3000 feet for 
look-ahead times between 110 and 120 seconds, while mean ADS-B errors were less 
than 500 feet. After further analysis, the increased predicted vertical separation error for 
radar data was attributed to increased noise (i.e., uncertainty) in the radar-derived 
vertical speed measurements when compared to ADS-B measurements. This difference 
in vertical speed measurements of the intruder aircraft is quantified in Figure 12, which 
shows a plot of the vertical speed measurements for all unmitigated encounters when 
the intruder was flying level.  For the 25th-75th percentile data, the vertical speeds for 
ADS-B data ranged from -151 ft to 164 ft, compared to -729 ft to 881 ft for the radar data 
from the same encounters. Additional discussion and analysis with respect to the effect 
of vertical separation error on alerting are provided later in this report.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Aggregate CPA prediction error for ADS-B surveillance data 
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The magnitude of the predicted horizontal separation error is similar for both ADS-B and 
radar-derived trajectories. It should be noted that overall trajectory prediction errors 
include other sources of error 
other than surveillance sensor 
type such as wind error, real 
variation in aircraft speed and 
altitude, etc. Consequently, 
known difference in ADS-B 
and radar sensor 
performance, especially in 
horizontal position, may not 
be fully realized due to the 
predominance of other real-
world errors. 
 
Predicted separation error 
analysis was also performed 
using the point of first loss of 
well clear, referred to simply 
as “first loss” herein. This 
analysis was similar to the 
CPA analysis described in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Comparison of aggregate CPA prediction error for ADS-B and RADAR  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Vertical speed comparison between ADS-B 
and Radar. 
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Figure 8, except the actual first loss DAA alert parameters described in Table 1 (alert 
level 3 and 4) were measured. The first loss parameters were 0.75 nautical mile 
horizontal miss distance, 450 feet minimum vertical separation, and a modified tau (i.e., 
horizontal closing rate) of 35 seconds. Figure 13 shows a comparison of first loss 
prediction error between ADS-B and radar-derived trajectories. Similar to the CPA 
prediction error analysis, radar-derived trajectories showed notably more predicted 
vertical separation error than did ADS-B-derived trajectories. Note that the point of first 
loss occurs earlier than the CPA. Predicted horizontal miss distance and modified tau 
errors for both ADS-B and radar trajectories were more comparable. 
Bearing measurements (i.e., horizontal position) from a Mode S transponder are known 
to be less accurate than either ADS-B or radar. This difference in horizontal position 
accuracy between ADS-B and Mode S can be measured in terms of trajectory prediction 
accuracy. Figure 14 shows a comparison of first-loss prediction error between ADS-B 
and Mode S derived trajectories. Predicted vertical separation errors were similar for 
both ADS-B and Mode S, but HMD and modified Tau errors were larger for Mode S 
derived trajectories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Comparison of aggregate first loss prediction error for ADS-B and Radar  
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Alerting Analysis 
The predicted separation analysis described above provides insight into the performance 
of the DAA system’s trajectory modeling. However, the operational impact of these 
trajectory prediction errors may be better assessed by analyzing DAA alerting 
performance. In general, good alerting performance is characterized by stable and 
consistent alerts with a minimal number of false alerts. Figure 15 is an example from an 
actual encounter of the various levels of alerting as a function of the alerting parameters. 
There are four alert levels: proximate, preventative, corrective, and warning (Table 1). 
Pilot action is only required for corrective (level 3) and warning (level 4) alerts and, 
therefore, will be the focus of the alerting analysis. Each symbol on a given plot indicates 
an alert for a given update rate (1 Hz). The line connecting multiple alerts signifies alerts 
for consecutive updates with the blue line connecting only consecutive corrective and/or 
warning alerts.  
 
An alerting “gap” between consecutive corrective and/or warning alerts of approximately 
20 seconds is highlighted in the upper right plot in Figure 15. In this encounter, for 
example, a corrective alert was displayed to the pilot for 4 seconds at around elapsed 
time of 70 seconds. Corrective alerts require pilot action. This initial series of corrective 
alerts is followed by approximately 20 seconds of lower severity proximate and 
preventative alerts which are advisory and do not require pilot action. This gap of 20 
seconds is then followed by a consistent series of corrective and warning alerts. Alerting 
gaps such as this are an indication of alerting instability and are considered operationally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Comparison of aggregate first loss prediction error for ADS-B and TCAS Mode S 
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undesirable because they may lead a pilot to take premature or unnecessary action. 
Moreover, alerting instability may degrade pilot trust in the system. 
 
An aggregate metric was developed to measure the frequency and cause of these 
alerting gaps across all scenarios. Once an alerting gap was identified, each update 
within the gap was analyzed to determine which alerting parameter did not meet the 
corrective or warning criteria (Table 1). In the alert gap example shown in Figure 15, the 
first update following the initial four seconds of corrective warning had a predicted 
vertical separation at first loss of 738 feet. This exceeded the vertical separation criteria 
for corrective/warning alerts of 450 feet by 288 feet, thus resulting in the gap.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Example of alerting as a function of alert parameters 
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Figure 16 shows the aggregate alert gap analysis results for ADS-B and radar-derived 
trajectories. The upper bar charts show the number of times a given alert parameter 
went out of bounds to cause an alerting gap. For those instances where multiple 
parameters went out of bounds during a given update, the parameter that exceeded the 
alerting criteria by the largest percentage was plotted as the primary cause of the alert 
gap.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Alert gap analysis for ADS-B and Radar-derived trajectories 
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The results in Figure 16 show the alerts derived from radar-based trajectories resulted in 
more alerting gaps than alerts derived from ADS-B based trajectories. Moreover, 
exceeding vertical separation criteria was the most common cause of alerting gaps, i.e., 
instability. Vertical separation criteria went out of bounds 1042 times with radar-based 
alerts compared to 313 times for ADS-B alerts over the same set of encounters. The 
lower set of plots in Figure 16 shows the magnitude of the vertical separation criteria 
exceedance as a function of time to first loss. The ADS-B instances exceeded the 450 
feet vertical separation criteria by less than 1000 feet whereas radar exceedance was as 
much as 6908 ft. This was due to the significantly noisier altitude and vertical speed 
measurements from the radar. 
 
Alerting performance with radar data can be improved with the application of Kalman 
filters to the altitude and vertical speed measurements. With the method described 
earlier, radar data from these encounters were replayed through the DAA system via 
Kalman filters applied to altitude and vertical speed. The resulting alerting performance 
is shown in Figure 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Alert gap analysis for Radar surveillance with and without Kalman filter  
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Alerting performance with radar surveillance was significantly improved with the 
application of Kalman filters. The instances of out-of-bound vertical separation were 
reduced from 1042 to 455. The corresponding maximum vertical separation criteria 
exceedance was reduced from 6908 feet to 1588 feet. When compared to the alerting 
performance of ADS-B, Figure 18 shows the application of Kalman filters to the radar 
surveillance resulted in comparable alerting performance.  
The application of Kalman filters can introduce potentially unacceptable amounts of lag 
to the surveillance data. Although surveillance data lag was not rigorously analyzed in 
this effort, researchers were cognizant of its effect while tuning the Kalman filter 
parameters and deemed the resulting lag qualitatively acceptable. 
 
A similar alerting performance analysis was performed with trajectories derived from 
TCAS Mode S surveillance data which were shown to be less accurate horizontally than 
ADS-B (Figure 14). This difference can be seen in the alerting performance shown in 
Figure 19. Unlike the ADS-B and Radar alerting performance where vertical separation 
was the most critical alerting parameter, horizontal miss distance (HMD) was the most 
critical alerting parameter with Mode S surveillance. The HMD alerting criteria went out 
of bounds 247 times compared to only 36 vertical separation criteria out-of-bounds 
instances with Mode S surveillance. For the same set of encounters with ADS-B 
surveillance, instances of out-of-bound HMD and vertical separation were 70 and 313, 
respectively. The lower plots in Figure 19 show the corresponding magnitude of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Alert gap analysis for ADS-B and Radar with Kalman filter 
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HMD alert criteria exceedance. For ADS-B, the HMD exceedance was no more than 0.3 
nmi, whereas HMD exceedance for Mode S was as much as 1.5 nmi.  
 
Turn Prediction Accuracy Analysis 
Turn prediction accuracy was assessed by analyzing data from the 12 mitigated 
encounters from the flight on July 22, 2015. During these mitigated encounters, pilots 
performed DAA maneuver guidance provided by Autoresolver. Although Autoresolver 
was able to calculate both turn and altitude maneuvers, only turn maneuver guidance 
occurred during this set of mitigated encounters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Alert gap analysis for ADS-B and TCAS Mode S 
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The methodology used to analyze turn prediction accuracy is shown in Figure 20. For 
each encounter, the ownship track data was analyzed to determine the start time of the 
turn maneuver, tstart. Generally, this meant the ground course began to change steadily 
following Autoresolver guidance. The trajectories of the ownship and the intruder at tstart 
were then saved as the reference predictions. Predicted horizontal separation error at 
various time increments after the start of each turn, Dtn, was calculated by subtracting the 
actual measured separation (ADS-B) from the predicted separation for the same time, 
Dtn. Turn prediction accuracy measured in terms of predicted horizontal separation error 
for each mitigated encounter is shown in Figure 21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Turn prediction accuracy analysis methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Turn prediction accuracy 
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A majority of the turns had an absolute maximum horizontal separation error of less than 
0.014 nmi. However, there were three outliers that exhibited as much as 0.13 nmi of 
error. In order to understand the difference between a poor turn prediction such as 
encounter L12E and a low-error turn prediction such as encounter L13A, the actual and 
predicted turn rates of each of the two encounters were plotted in Figure 22. For 
encounter L12E, the actual turn appears to have been initiated at a slow rate, perhaps 
inadvertently, before being completed at the prescribed standard rate of 3 degrees per 
second. Although the increased error could be attributed to incorrectly selecting the turn 
start time, encounter L12E does serve to illustrate the impact of pilot response delay on 
horizontal separation.   
 
Encounter L13A did not exhibit a similar slow or delayed turn initiation as seen with 
encounter L12E. The relatively small error is attributable to the difference between the 
computed turn rate of 2.6 degrees per second and the actual turn rate which varied up to 
about 3.1 degrees per second.  
 
At the time of this flight test, Autoresolver modeled turning DAA maneuvers with a 
constant bank angle of 20 degrees. As a result, there is a difference in predicted turn 
rates for encounters L12E and L13A. Currently, the DAA MOPS specifies maneuvers at 
a standard rate turn of 3 degrees per second or, in some situations when a turn rate of 3 
degrees is infeasible, a half rate turn at 1.5 degrees per second.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Effect of turn rate on turn prediction accuracy 
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Conclusions 
The analysis of Flight Test 3 data was primarily focused on assessing the effects of 
surveillance sensors on trajectory prediction accuracy and DAA alerting performance. An 
analysis methodology was developed to take full advantage of post-flight surveillance 
sensor data processing and JADEM/Autoresolver playback capability to maximize the 
use of data collected during the flights. 
 
Prediction accuracy of trajectories derived from each of the individual surveillance 
sensors was measured using ADS-B-derived trajectories as a comparative reference. 
Vertical separation errors for radar-derived trajectories were found to be an order of 
magnitude greater than ADS-B trajectories at look-ahead times between 110 and 120 
seconds. Mean predicted vertical separation error was nearly 3000 ft with the radar 
compared to less than 500 ft with ADS-B for the same scenarios.  
 
These larger vertical separation errors were attributed to more uncertainty and noise in 
the altitude and vertical speed measurements from the radar. Additional analysis 
showed the application of a Kalman filter to the radar altitude and vertical speed 
measurements could reduce the predicted vertical separation errors to levels 
comparable to that of ADS-B without an unacceptable amount of lag. 
 
Trajectory predictions derived from TCAS Mode S transponders had greater errors than 
trajectory predictions derived from ADS-B in terms of horizontal miss distance and 
modified tau. This flight test result confirms the trajectory accuracy impact of the known 
bearing inaccuracies associated with TCAS Mode S surveillance data. 
 
A methodology and metrics were developed to quantify DAA system alerting 
performance. This alerting analysis methodology quantitatively showed the vertical 
separation alerting criteria to be the most sensitive to trajectory prediction uncertainty 
and noise, especially with respect to radar surveillance. 
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Appendix – Scenario Summary 
A summary of the scenarios flown for the JADEM/Autoresolver DAA system is shown in 
Table A1. Additional scenario details as well as actual flight test cards can be found in 
(Marsten, Sternberg, & Valkov). 
 
Table A1 – Summary of JADEM/Autoresolver scenarios flown  
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L12A 1000 0 3000 150 180 12000 0 12000 13000 0 13000 
L12C 1000 45 3000 150 180 12000 0 12000 13000 0 13000 
L12D 1000 90 3000 150 180 12000 0 12000 13000 0 13000 
L12E 1000 110 0.0 150 180 12000 0 12000 13000 0 13000 
L12M 1000 45 0.0 150 180 12000 0 12000 13000 0 13000 
L12N 1000 90 0.0 150 180 12000 0 12000 13000 0 13000 
L13A 1000 0 0.0 150 140 16500 0 16500 12500 1000 15500 
L13C 1000 45 0.0 150 140 16500 0 16500 12500 1000 15500 
L13D 1000 90 0.0 150 140 16500 0 16500 12500 1000 15500 
L14A 1000 0 0.0 150 140 12000 0 12000 16000 -1000 13000 
L14C 1000 45 0.0 150 140 12000 0 12000 16000 -1000 13000 
L14D 1000 90 0.0 150 140 12000 0 12000 16000 -1000 13000 
L15A 1000 0 0.0 120 150 12000 1000 15000 16000 0 16000 
L15C 1000 45 0.0 120 150 12000 1000 15000 16000 0 16000 
L15D 1000 90 0.0 120 150 12000 1000 15000 16000 0 16000 
L16A 1000 0 0.0 120 150 16000 -1000 13000 12000 0 12000 
L16C 1000 45 0.0 120 150 16000 -1000 13000 12000 0 12000 
L16D 1000 90 0.0 120 150 16000 -1000 13000 12000 0 12000 
L32A 300 0 3000 150 180 12000 0 12000 12300 0 12300 
L32C 300 45 3000 150 180 12000 0 12000 12300 0 12300 
L32D 300 90 3000 150 180 12000 0 12000 12300 0 12300 
L52A 500 0 3000 150 180 12000 0 12000 12500 0 12500 
L52C 500 45 3000 150 180 12000 0 12000 12500 0 12500 
L52D 500 90 3000 150 180 12000 0 12000 12500 0 12500 
* - Indicated airspeed denoted by italics, otherwise specified as ground speed 
 
